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STATE IMPERILED SPECIES LEGISLATION
BY
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN,* VICKY J. MERETSKY,** WILLEM DREWS,*** KATLIN
STEPHANI**** & JENNIFER TESON*****

State wildlife conservation programs are essential to
accomplishing the national goal of extinction prevention. By virtue of
their constitutional powers, their expertise, and their on-the-ground
personnel, states could—in theory—accomplish far more than the
federal agencies directly responsible for implementing the Endangered
Species Act (ESA). States plausibly argue that they can catalyze
collaborative conservation that brings together key stakeholders to
improve conditions for imperiled species. Bills to revise the ESA seek
to delegate greater authority to states. We evaluated states’ imperiled
species legislation to determine their legal capacity to employ the key
regulatory tools that prompt collaborative conservation. All but four
states possess statutory programs to identify species on the brink of
extinction. Most of them include both animals protected under the ESA
and wildlife imperiled just within the boundaries of the state. Thirtyfour states legislate imperiled plant protection programs. States
generally fail to prohibit habitat impairment by private parties, lack
permit programs to minimize incidental harms to species and spur
habitat conservation, and do not restrict state agency actions that
undermine species recovery. Compared to the key regulatory programs
of the ESA that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on conservation,
state laws—in general—reflect a more permissive attitude. Though
state laws, in the aggregate, only weakly support cooperative
federalism, some state legislative provisions are very strong. Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin even go beyond the ESA in their
protective measures. Major funding increases to pay for conservation
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measures could overcome weak agency regulatory authority, but
prospects for a spending spree are dim. Therefore, some state
legislative reform will be necessary to implement stronger cooperative
federalism under the ESA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act1 (ESA) may well be the most contentious
of the federal environmental statutes. It certainly is the most controversial
of the conservation laws outside the purview of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Yet, in congressional hearing after
congressional hearing, one consensus rises above the rancor. All parties
agree that states should play a greater role in preventing extinctions.2
Immense conservation benefits would accrue from more active state
programs designed to arrest the decline of rare species or to recover
endangered species. Alas, potential benefits are seldom realized because
neither state treasuries nor the federal appropriations provide sufficient
resources for conservation actions. But, suppose Congress decided to
transfer the federal endangered species budget to states through block

1

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).

2

E.g., Oversight: Modernization of the Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 161 (2017) (statement of Jamie Rappaport Clark,
President and CEO, Defenders of Wildlife); id. at 161–62 (testimony of Dan M. Ashe, President
and CEO, Association of Zoos and Aquariums); W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOLUTION 201608: SPECIES CONSERVATION AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1–2 (2016),
https://perma.cc/6XMR-NKBK [hereinafter WGA POLICY RESOLUTION] (recommending statutory
reforms for greater state involvement); see also H.R. 4315, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2014) (passed
by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 29, 2014) (requiring a greater role for states in ESA
listing decisions); S. 1731, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013) (requiring state consent for listing decisions
and allowing states to assert exclusive authority to manage intra-state listed species and
highlighting the role of states in listing decisions and in conservation partnerships); The

Endangered Species Act: Reviewing the Nexus of Science and Policy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology,
112th Cong. 3 (2011), https://perma.cc/NA82-5G3K (testimony of Gary Frazer, Assistant
Director, Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
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grants.3 Would that prove more effective than the current approach? Putting
aside the political and implementation uncertainties over how effectively
states would spend new monies, this Article shows that there is another
hurdle to greater delegation of responsibility to prevent extinction: weak
state legislation.
We reviewed legislation relevant to recovery of imperiled species for all
fifty states. Most states adopt the argot of the ESA, which refers to species
on the brink of extinction as “endangered” and those with a somewhat lower
risk of disappearing as “threatened.” But other states define the words
differently or employ alternative terminology. Therefore, we use the term
“imperiled” to refer generally to species identified as needing special
protections to avoid extinction. The ESA defines “conservation” to mean the
use of methods “necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened
species to the point at which the measures provided [by the Act] are no
longer necessary.”4 In this sense, conservation is synonymous with recovery.
Conservation and recovery are modest goals intended to move the very most
imperiled species out of the legislative, emergency-room treatments of the
ESA. They do not imply that a species has regained most of its habitat or
historic abundance. When the term “conservation” is used in other contexts,
it has a broader meaning that generally promises more abundant and healthy
wildlife.5
Part II of this Article constructs the cooperative federalism framework
for understanding current debates about ESA reform. The ESA authorizes
cooperative agreements, which serve as a conduit for federal grants to help
states conduct conservation actions that aid federal efforts to recover
species. Other environmental law programs present a more varied toolbox
of state incentives that offer options for better promoting effective
cooperation to prevent extinctions. Part III describes the three regulatory
pillars of the ESA that account for the most species protections: interagency
coordination, prohibitions, and permits. Part IV details our method of coding
legislation to compare state imperiled species law with the ESA.
Part V presents our results. We found legislative programs designed to
recover imperiled animals in all but four states. Two states protect only
species on the ESA list, and thirty-nine states automatically include ESAlisted species among their longer imperiled species lists. Thirty-four states
legislate imperiled plant protection programs. Of the twenty-four states that
require periodic administrative updates to the status of listed species,
twenty require status reviews every five years or more frequently. Only three
state laws require preparation of species-specific recovery plans. Eleven
state legislative codes require interagency cooperation to ensure that state
agencies do not take actions to jeopardize state-listed species. Most state

3 E.g., WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 7 (calling for ESA block grant funding
allowing states to spend the money according to their own priorities).
4 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
5 See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C.
§ 668ee(4) (defining “conservation” to mean “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and
enhance, healthy populations of . . . wildlife, and plants”).

7_TOJCI.FISCHMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

84

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/3/2018 10:00 AM

[Vol. 48:81

wildlife legal regimes ban trafficking and purposeful actions to kill, capture,
or injure an imperiled species. However, only two state statutes clearly
prohibit habitat degradation that is incidental to some otherwise legal
activity, such as farming.6 Nonetheless, seven state laws provide for
incidental take permits, indicating a somewhat broader scope of
prohibitions (as administered) than is apparent from the face of the statutes.
Part VI discusses how our results relate to the current debates over
ESA reauthorization. Compared to the key regulatory programs of the ESA
that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on conservation, state laws, in
general, reflect a more permissive attitude. Though state laws, in the
aggregate, only weakly support cooperative federalism, some state
legislative provisions are very strong. State programs in Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin even go beyond the ESA in their protective
measures. They offer helpful models for other states seeking to improve the
effectiveness of their imperiled species laws. However, we cannot speak to
actual administration of the programs, in practice. We conclude with
broader observations about how to make the ESA-reform debate more
constructive and responsive to the consensus that state conservation
programs are essential to preventing extinctions.
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND EXTINCTION PREVENTION
Cooperative federalism has framed U.S. environmental law for the past
half century.7 It is most closely associated with EPA, which relies on state
personnel to permit and enforce programs that advance objectives under
federal pollution-control statutes.8 But the natural resources side of
environmental law also harnesses cooperative federalism.9 The ESA
expressly addresses cooperative federalism in section 6, which requires the
relevant cabinet officials to cooperate with states “to the maximum extent
practicable.”10 This reflects a common, deferential formulation of savings
clauses for state authority in federal natural resources statutes.11 Section 6
authorizes cooperative agreements between federal agencies and states only
to recover species already listed under the ESA.12 The ESA does not
6 A third state, New York, prohibits incidental take according to a judicial interpretation of
more ambiguous language in its statute. See State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d
78, 80, 82–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (upholding an injunction against a mine that erected a fence
that kept state-listed rattlesnakes from making their seasonal migration); see also infra notes
251–252 and accompanying text.
7 Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 179, 187 (2005).
8 Id. at 188–89.
9 See generally id. at 193–204 (arguing that the state-federal system of managing natural
resources can be understood as cooperative federalism).
10 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a).
11 Robert L. Fischman & Angela M. King, Savings Clauses and Trends in Natural Resources
Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 161 (2007) (explaining that more courts
are adopting interpretation approaches that encourage “federal reconsideration of state
interests in public land management”).
12 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1)–(2).
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expressly authorize agreements with or grants to states to protect declining
species in order to stave off federal listing. Instead, a separate federal grant
program provides states with funding to undertake actions focused on
preventing imperilment.13 States with federally approved state wildlife action
plans (SWAPs) are eligible for this preventive funding.14
States have complained for decades about implementation of the
section 6 cooperative agreements program. Many states would interpret the
self-contradicting text of section 6 to prohibit federal preemption of state
programs weaker than federal law.15 Though there is support for that view in
the legislative history,16 courts have rejected the antipreemption arguments.17
The result is cooperative agreements that “demand very little from the states
and offer the same in return.”18 Most of the agreements relate to listing,
monitoring, and voluntary conservation programs.19 Congress has increased
section 6 funding in the past quarter century, from 1% of the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) budget in 1990 ($6.7 million),20 to 3% in 2000
($26.9 million),21 and to 3.5% in 2017 ($53.5 million).22 That funding offers

13 Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669c(d) (describing the
requirements for the state wildlife grants tied to state wildlife action plans (SWAPs), first
authorized in Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-63, 115 Stat. 408 (2001)).
14 Id.; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: PART 517 FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE—ELIGIBILITY
&
PROGRAM-SPECIFIC
REQUIREMENTS
§ 10
(2010),
https://perma.cc/NR9C-3CRV (setting out the requirements for approving SWAPs).
15 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1535(g)(2)(A) (stating that takings prohibitions set forth in 1533(d)
for resident species do not apply to a state with a cooperative agreement), and id. § 1533(d)
(stating that protective regulations apply only if the state has adopted those regulations), with
id. § 1535(f) (emphasizing that a state law that interferes with the purpose of the ESA is void).
16 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 9–10 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 979, 986–89;
S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2996–97. For a
comprehensive review of the legislative history of ESA section 6, see generally Robert P.
Davison, The Evolution of Federalism Under Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act, in THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM: EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE
COMMITMENT 89 (Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, Jr. eds., 2011).
17 E.g., Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992) (holding that
“the less restrictive takings provisions under Montana law are preempted by the ESA”); United
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that “to
the extent that California’s law on taking is less protective than the Endangered Species Act, it
is preempted”); see also Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation

from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 81 (2002) (summarizing the operation of ESA section 6 in
the context of cooperative federalism); John Copeland Nagle, The Original Role of the States in
the Endangered Species Act, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 414–18 (2017) (providing an insightful review
of the legislative history of section 6 and Swan View Coalition).
18 J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act: A Comparative
Assessment and Call for Change, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note
16, at 35, 35.
19 Id. at 41.
20 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-512, 104 Stat. 1915, 1918 (1990).
21 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-291, 114 Stat. 922, 927 (2000).
22 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 139–40.
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ample incentive to induce most states to enter into agreements.23 A state
receiving cooperative funds must surmount the low bar of showing that it
has enacted authority to conserve resident species, has established
acceptable conservation programs, possesses authority to conduct
investigations to determine the status of animal species, and provides for
public participation in designating species as imperiled.24 It must also match
a portion of the costs of projects funded.25 State spending constitutes about
5% of total ESA appropriations.26
Appropriations still fall far short of the estimated costs of preventing
extinction, however. The total costs of recovering the 1,661 ESA-listed
species in the United States is unknown.27 But one can derive recovery costs
for those 1,159 species with recovery plans. The plans identify costs of $1.21
billion/year.28 Currently, FWS tallies spending of federal and state
governments together for endangered species protection between one and
two billion dollars annually.29 However, that includes funding all aspects of
the program, including listing, which is not directly tied to recovering
already listed species.30 Nearly all of that money goes to staff salaries and
operations, not directly to recovery efforts.31 A peer-reviewed study of the
budget indicated that Congress funds less than 25% of the aggregate annual
recovery plan costs.32 The budget outlook for the foreseeable future remains
austere.
Since 1994, the United States Department of the Interior’s FWS and the
Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
(collectively, the Services) policy on section 6 cooperation has emphasized
the states’ role in preventing listing by alleviating threats to declining

23 Grants: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/79TL-J7P3 (last updated
Jan. 4, 2017) (noting that most states have entered into cooperative agreements). J.B. Ruhl
states that all states have entered into cooperative agreements, which our findings show would
result in grants to states that have only the weakest basis for meeting the ESA criteria. Ruhl,
supra note 18, at 41.
24 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (2012).
25 Grants: Overview, supra note 23 (states must match 25% of most project costs unless
they are implementing a cooperative project with other states, in which case the match is 10%).
26 Alejandro E. Camacho et al., Assessing State Laws and Resources for Endangered
Species Protection, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,837, 10,838 (Oct. 1, 2017).
27 Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/7JJCS686 (last updated Jan. 27, 2018).
28 Id.; see Leah R. Gerber, Conservation Triage or Injurious Neglect in Endangered Species
Recovery, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 3563, 3563, 3565 (2016) (statistics based on 2016
data with 1,125 listed species).
29 Endangered Species Act Document Library, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://perma.cc/VCX3-EVVP (last updated Dec. 3, 2017) (listing annual Expenditure Reports
from 1996–2015). The most recent report tallied $1.3 billion in ESA-conservation expenditures.
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES
EXPENDITURES 78 (2014), https://perma.cc/NJB8-BZAY [hereinafter FWS EXPENDITURES].
30 FWS EXPENDITURES, supra note 29, at 4.
31 For the actual appropriations going to recovery plan tasks, see Gerber, supra note 28,
app. 1–39.
32 Id. at 3563.
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species.33 Pursuant to the policy, the Services enter into candidate
conservation agreements with states and other stakeholders to apply
conservation measures to a particular species, which are then considered in
listing decisions.34 Most rare and declining species are not on the very brink
of extinction.35 The SWAPs required for states to be eligible for federal
nongame conservation grants have identified over 12,000 species of greatest
conservation need (SGCN), which are generally declining in range or
population.36 The SGCNs include ESA-listed species as well as rare and
declining species that might be eligible for listing if the state fails to
conserve them.37 Each state’s wildlife action plan contains conservation
actions to sustain and restore SGCN populations. Unfortunately,
implementation has been hampered by inadequate funding.38 A recent study
estimates that implementation of the state action plans would require $1.3
billion annually, which would be a bargain if it fulfilled its promise of
stemming the tide of new ESA listings.39 Most state officials and
conservationists agree that increasing funding for conservation of SGCNs
would alleviate many ESA controversies because fewer species would
decline to the point of listing.40
Virtually no player in U.S. politics wins points by praising federal
bureaucrats. Members of Congress, like fellow politicians, are fond of
promoting better management by transferring authorities from “distant
bureaucrats” in Washington to state officials, who are regarded as “closest”
to the conservation needs of species.41 Tilting the balance of cooperative
federalism more toward states has many benefits. For instance, state fish

33 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative
Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,274, 34,275 (July 1, 1994). Recently, the Services revised the policy. See Revised Interagency
Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities,
81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. IV).
34 E.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. ET AL., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENT FOR THE
LOUISIANA PINE SNAKE 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/9N93-94PH (addressing conservation needs of
a rare snake through cooperation among FWS, federal land managers, state agencies, and other
parties).
35 H.R 1314, H.R. 1927, H.R. 4256, H.R. 4284, H.R. 4319, and H.R. 4866: Legislative Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 113th Cong. 17 (2014) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared

statement of Robert L. Fischman, Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law);
see also Vicky J. Meretsky et al., A State-Based National Network for Effective Wildlife
Conservation, 62 BIOSCIENCE 970, 970, 974–75 (2012) (describing the importance of state
programs that identify declining species before they get to the point of imperilment).
36 ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S FISH AND WILDLIFE: A 21ST
CENTURY VISION FOR INVESTING IN AND CONNECTING PEOPLE TO NATURE 6 (2016),
https://perma.cc/G7T3-3U32.
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
E.g., Hearings, supra note 35, at 17–19 (prepared statement of Robert L. Fischman,

Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law).
41 E.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Nat. Res., Committee to Hold Endangered Species
Act Hearing (May 28, 2013), https://perma.cc/F6FW-A7HD (addressing positive and cooperative
species conservation efforts).
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and wildlife agencies employ 50,000 staff on the front lines of conservation
challenges.42 But, their funding is paltry compared to their current needs.
Shouldering greater responsibility for imperiled species recovery is not
realistic without a significant increase in funding. In 2016, the Association of
Fish & Wildlife Agencies launched a major initiative to address the funding
problems through federal appropriations from royalties, fees, and bonus
bids collected by federal energy resource agencies.43 The Land and Water
Conservation Fund, which assists federal agencies and states/local
jurisdictions with property acquisition, pulls from similar sources of federal
revenue.44 Its fate in budget negotiations will serve as a harbinger of the
success of the state wildlife funding initiative.
But, even taking the most optimistic scenario for greater state funding,
it will be hard to improve the success rate for species recovery without the
legal tools that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on conservation projects.
Under the ESA, federal agencies can threaten enforcement of draconian
bans on harming species through habitat modifications, or halting desired
federal programs and permits.45 Federal agencies seldom carry through on
those dreaded outcomes.46 But the specter of enforcement, though unlikely,
does motivate collaborative conservation by landowners, their lenders, and
others whose businesses create habitat degradation or otherwise impede
recovery. Decades of research by Steven Yaffee and Julia Wondolleck found
that conservation collaboration successes depend on “legal structures that
establish management bottom lines” for conservation goals.47 The ESA, in
particular, served as the “regulatory driver” of stakeholder cooperation in
about half of the hundreds of conservation collaborations they studied.48 The
legal mandates create incentives to collaborate on projects that avoid more
drastic outcomes (e.g., ESA section 7 jeopardy)49 and to establish clear
42 Oversight: Modernization of the Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Env’t & Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 50 (2017) (statement of Gordon S. Myers, Executive

Director, North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, and President, Southeastern
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies). As early as the enactment of the 1973 ESA, Congress
noted that the most efficient way to recover species was to tap into state wildlife agencies. S.
REP. NO. 93-307, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 303.
43 ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, supra note 36, at 10.
44 Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 54 U.S.C. §§ 200301–200310 (Supp. II
2015) (describing sources of funding for land and water conservation).
45 See Jacob W. Malcom & Ya-Wei Li, Data Contradict Common Perceptions About a
Controversial Provision of the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S.
15,844, 15,844–45 (2015).
46 See id. at 15,845 (finding only 0.0023% of all 6,829 formal consultations between 2008 and
April 2015 resulted in jeopardy decisions); see also MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 234 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that the federal government
rarely prosecutes incidental takes).
47 Steven L. Yaffee, Collaborative Strategies for Managing Animal Migrations: Insights from
the History of Ecosystem-Based Management, 41 ENVTL. L. 655, 677 (2011).
48 Id.; see STEVEN L. YAFFEE ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE 21, 27 (1996); see also JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L.
YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 102, 240 (2000) (describing more case studies).
49 See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
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accountability through scientifically sound goalposts for tracking success.50
The ESA statutory threshold of jeopardy has been credited with signaling
when key ecological thresholds of disruption may be crossed and prompting
collaborative approaches to water governance.51 If legislation or
administration were to push more species recovery responsibility toward
states, could the states mount similar incentives for private actors to
collaborate?
Our research attempts to answer that question by evaluating the
legislative authorities defining the duties and powers of state agencies
responsible for wildlife management. In brief, we find most states possess
insufficient statutory authority. Nonetheless, some state laws offer good
models to strengthen other states’ ability to prevent extinctions. Before
presenting the results of our analysis, we review how the ESA establishes
incentives for conservation. The next Part surveys the key ESA provisions
against which we measure state laws in Parts IV and V.
III. THE THREE REGULATORY PILLARS OF THE ESA
In order to be protected under the ESA, species must be listed and
critical habitats designated under a notice-and-comment, informal
rulemaking procedure.52 No unlisted species or undesignated habitats
receive any protection under the ESA, no matter how biologically imperiled
they may be.53 The Services share responsibility for these programs and are
often called the “listing agencies.”54 Species are listed as endangered55 or
threatened,56 depending on the imminence of extinction risk.57 The Services’
cooperative federalism policy promises that they will “utilize the expertise”
of and “solicit” information from state wildlife agencies on listing and other
regulatory rulemaking.58 In addition to enforcing the regulatory programs
50

Yaffee, supra note 47, at 677–78.
Bruce C. Chaffin et al., Resilience, Adaptation, and Transformation in the Klamath River
Basin Social-Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 191 (2014); Barbara Cosens et al., The
51

Adaptive Water Governance Project: Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional
Socio-Ecological Water Systems Facing a Changing Climate, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 27 (2014).
52

ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012).
OF WILDLIFE, PROTECTING UNLISTED SPECIES: ASSESSING AND IMPROVING
CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS WITH ASSURANCES 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/KY6DRKKR.
54 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., UPDATED STATUS OF FEDERALLY LISTED ESUS OF WEST
COAST SALMON AND STEELHEAD 8 (Thomas P. Good et al. eds., 2005).
55 Endangered species are those “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of [their] range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
56 Threatened species are those “likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of [their] range.” Id. § 1532(20).
57 See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(D) Rule Litigation, 748 F.
Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D.D.C. 2010) (acknowledging “a temporal element to the distinction between
the categories of endangered and threatened species” based on the plain language of the
statute).
58 Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in
Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8663 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. ch. IV).
53

See DEFS.
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that apply after listing, the Services have a duty to prepare a recovery plan
for each listed species.59 However, compliance with the plans is not
mandatory,60 so we exclude them from our description of regulatory
elements of the ESA. Recovery plans are important to provide clear
objectives for collaborative conservation. But they do not require
stakeholders to act.
Once listed, three key regulatory programs work to protect species. The
first program involves federal agency action that triggers interagency,
interdisciplinary analysis. Under section 7 of the ESA, an action agency (one
authorizing, funding, or carrying out an action) that may affect a listed
species must consult with the listing Service.61 This consultation involves the
same kind of look-before-you-leap evaluation as the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act62 and the National Environmental Policy Act63 (NEPA).64
The main difference between the ESA consultation process and those other
statutory programs is that the procedural elements are supplemented by a
substantive threshold banning certain actions due to adverse impacts.65
Section 7 prohibits actions that the analysis shows are “likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of” a listed species or “result in the destruction or
adverse modification of” critical habitat.66 This motivates the action agency
(and the permittee if the impacts are from a proposed authorization of
private activity, such as filling a wetland) to mitigate impacts so that they
fall short of the jeopardy threshold.
Because state law generally cannot constrain federal agencies, there are
relatively few ways for states to take on more responsibility for section 7
consultation. Under NEPA, state agencies may receive cooperating agency
status, which allows them to exert influence over the impact analysis
without having to wait for formal comment periods.67 It is possible that a
revision of the section 7 consultation regulations could facilitate similar
state involvement on the inside of consultation, which typically has few
windows for public notice and comment.68 The current cooperative
federalism policy of the Services promises to inform state agencies of
federal agency actions subject to consultation, to request relevant
59 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). As of November 26, 2017, 1159 of the 1661 listed species in the United
States have approved recovery plans. Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), supra note 27.
60 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 388–89 (D. Wyo. 1987)
(“Congressional intent supports the view that the Secretary is required to develop a recovery
plan only insofar as he reasonably believes that it would promote conservation.”).
61 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
62 Id. §§ 661–666c.
63 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4333 (2012).
64 Id. § 4321 (providing that one of NEPA’s purposes is “to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment”).
65 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
66
67
68

Id.
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.6, 1505.3 (2016).
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 660 n.6 (2007) (noting

that the public does not have a right under the ESA to comment on interagency consultations
(citing Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final Rule, 51
Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,928 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402))).
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information from the relevant states, and to request an update of
information prior to concluding consultation.69 State wildlife agencies often
have deep expertise on listed species within their jurisdictions, which may
be reason enough to include states in consultation in a more formal way.
The Services recognized this expertise in their 2016 policy revisions to
promote greater state involvement in formal consultation under section 7.70
Some states develop relevant experience in evaluating agency impacts
through state laws that limit their own actions along procedural or
substantive lines similar to the ESA.71 But wholesale devolution of federal
consultation is not feasible.
The second key element of the ESA involves the broad, section 9
prohibitions against activities that “take” individuals of a listed animal
species.72 Take is but one of several section 9 prohibitions, most of which
address trafficking.73 But it is the broadest, most controversial, and most
responsive to the chief cause of species imperilment: habitat alteration.74
Congress defined “take” to include “harm,”75 which the Services interpret as:
“an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”76 The take prohibition is the
element that states could potentially play a much larger role in
implementing. Unlike section 7, which is applicable only to federal agencies,
the section 9 prohibitions apply to all persons.77 State police power to
provide for public health and welfare, and to fulfill wildlife trust
responsibilities,78 is a better match for limiting private activities to conserve

69 Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in
Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. ch. IV).
70 See id. at 8663–65.
71 See id. at 8664.
72 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012).
73 Id. § 1538(a), (d), (f).
74 David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48
BIOSCIENCE 607, 607–08 & tbl.1 (1998) (finding habitat degradation is a threat to 85% of
imperiled species); see REED F. NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING: HABITAT
CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2 (1997); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL ET
AL., SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 7, 35–38, 40, 94 (1995).
75 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
76 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. (Sweet
Home), 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) (upholding this regulatory definition).
77 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). The ESA defines “person” to mean “an individual, corporation,
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.” Id. § 1532(13).
78 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) (discussing the states’ “broad trustee and
police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions”); see also Michael C. Blumm &
Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1442, 1477 (explaining that
all states except Nevada and Utah have asserted a fiduciary duty and power to conserve
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species than federal power under the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The federal government and its enforcement offices generally
lack the land-use control authorities that most states delegate to local
governments. Local governments, operating under state enabling statutes,
have much greater leverage than the Services to monitor, minimize, and
mitigate habitat loss for imperiled species.79 States are the logical
implementing agents for the vast majority of conservation challenges where
habitat degradation or loss is the leading threat to the continued existence
of a species.80 On the other hand, even with more money, states and local
governments may lack the political will and expertise to prevent habitat
degradation.
For threatened species only, the ESA provides flexibility for the listing
agencies to loosen some of the prohibitions that are statutorily applied to
endangered species. The Services may promulgate ESA section “4(d) rules”
exercising this authority, which allows for relief from the ban on incidental
take81 through habitat alteration.82 The Services sometimes use this
administrative flexibility to induce state cooperation in recovery efforts in
exchange for special exceptions to otherwise applicable prohibitions.83
Prohibitions are common in federal environmental law and often serve
as gateways to permit programs. For instance, the Clean Water Act84 (CWA)
prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person.”85 However, the
proscription primarily functions as a trigger for dischargers to seek permits
that limit harm rather than as an outright ban of the discharges. Though not
originally the purpose of the ESA section 9 prohibitions, after 1982 they
often function to channel habitat-modifying activities into permit programs.86
The most important such program is the third key ESA regulatory
element: incidental take permits. Section 10 of the ESA allows otherwise
prohibited takes where they are incidental to, rather than the purpose of, the

wildlife). Most states also assert some form of ownership over wild animals. See, e.g., IND. CODE
§ 14-22-1-1(a) (2017).
79 See WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 1–4.
80 See id. at 1–2 (calling for an ESA amendment that provides incentives to state and local
governments to craft “land-use and development plans that meet the objectives of the ESA as
well as local needs”); see also Douglas P. Wheeler, It Ain’t Broke but It Should Be Fixed, ENVTL.
F., May/June 2016, at 57, 57 (proposing that the Services “delegate responsibility for
administration of the ESA to states, like California, which have robust programs of their own”).
81 An incidental take results from a side-effect of an otherwise legal activity (e.g., farming)
rather than from the purpose of the activity (e.g., hunting). 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016).
82 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (allowing regulations “necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of [threatened] species”).
83 See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 133–34 (analyzing the track record and
potential of ESA 4(d) rules to promote conservation through cooperative federalism); see also
infra notes 91–103 and accompanying text (describing examples of the use of cooperative
federalism 4(d) rules).
84 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
85 Id. § 1311(a).
86 See generally Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96
Stat. 1411, 1422–24 (providing amendments to the ESA that allow permits for takings and
habitat modifications).
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activity.87 By providing flexibility for otherwise illegal incidental takes, the
permit program paradoxically increased the Services’ leverage over habitatdegrading activities “because it substituted a flexible regulatory authority for
a threat of prosecution that few found credible.”88 For instance, when
improved flood control on the Sacramento River facilitated development in
the Natomas Basin of California, landowners and local jurisdictions secured
an incidental take permit for development in order to degrade habitat of the
giant garter snake and several other ESA-listed species.89 The permit
included various commitments to minimize impacts, primarily through a
statutorily required habitat conservation plan that established a conservancy
to purchase, preserve, and manage mitigation habitat.90 However, unlike the
permit programs under federal pollution-control statutes, the ESA fails to
authorize states to take over implementation of the incidental take
permitting process.
One way to overcome this lack of delegation authority in the statute is
through ESA 4(d) rules for threatened (but not endangered) species.91 A
section 4(d) rule may allow incidental takes or otherwise prohibited harms if
they occur pursuant to a particular plan or permit. For instance, FWS allows
ranchers and farmers to take (either directly or incidentally) threatened
Utah prairie dogs as long as they have permits from the Utah Division of
Wildlife Resources.92 Rather than applying for federal section 10 permits
after preparing habitat conservation plans, the agricultural land users merely
apply to the state agency under a more permissive permitting regime.93 This
saves the farmers and ranchers both the expense of developing a habitat
conservation plan as well as the impact fees that typically fund mitigation

87 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). Section 10 also authorizes a number of other programs and
exceptions (e.g., scientific permits, hardship exemptions, and experimental population
designations), which are not as prominent as the incidental take permits. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A),
(b).
88 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 46.
89 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277–78, 1294, 1302 (E.D. Cal. 2000)
(denying a 1997 permit for failure to adequately comply with several statutory conditions,
including minimizing and mitigating the impacts of the takings, and ensuring adequate funding
for the mitigation plan). The parties subsequently renegotiated the plan to the satisfaction of the
court. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, No. CIV-S-04-0579 DFL JF, 2005 WL 2175874, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 7, 2005) (upholding the revised 2003 incidental take permit).
90 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
91 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d); Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 89; W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N,
WGA SPECIES CONSERVATION AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT INITIATIVE YEAR TWO
RECOMMENDATIONS 4, https://perma.cc/6C4A-ZZQC (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) [hereinafter WGA
RECOMMENDATIONS] (promoting section 4(d) rules as vehicles for greater cooperative
federalism).
92 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(2)–(3) (2016); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop.
Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 2017) (upholding the
constitutionality of ESA regulation of Utah prairie dogs on private property).
93 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(3); People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners, 852 F.3d at
995, 997 (comparing the requirements for permitting through the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources (UDWR) with the base permit requirements from ESA for incidental takings, and
concluding that the UDWR requirements are less stringent).
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projects.94 One worry about the ESA 4(d) rule approach is that it will not
generate sufficient funds for offsetting the adverse impacts from
development.95 In the urban areas surrounding the Puget Sound, NMFS
applies all the endangered prohibitions of ESA section 9 to the threatened
Chinook salmon unless the takes occur pursuant to thirteen limitations
approved by the listing agency.96 Some of the limitations relate to activities
complying with particular programs named in the 4(d) rule, such as the
Washington forest practices control program for fish conservation.97 This
limitation rewards a state agency’s existing collaborative conservation
efforts. Other limitations offer inducements for county and municipal
jurisdictions to submit comprehensive land use plans for approval.98 If NMFS
approves a plan, then all development proceeding under the plan is shielded
from incidental take liability.99 This operates in much the same way as a
large-scale, area-wide habitat conservation plan,100 such as the one approved
in the Natomas Basin.101 But it does not require that all the incidental take
permit criteria be met. The cooperative federalism for threatened animals
invites states to strike deals with the Services that allow for state permitting
and planning to substitute for incidental take permits.102 FWS has also
experimented with relying on state rulemaking to issue incidental take
permits, even for endangered species in some circumstances.103
Of the three most powerful regulatory tools that influence habitatdisturbing behavior, federal interagency cooperation under ESA section 7
has the least potential for greater cooperative federalism. But it is a useful
model for state laws seeking to reshape state agency decisions, such as
industrial siting permits and highway construction. The section 9
prohibitions against incidental take through habitat alteration could serve as
federal floors upon which states could build their own imperiled species
programs. Incidental take permitting is perfectly suited for state
implementation and integration with planning and zoning.
94 E.g., Martin Wachs, It’s All About Finding the Money, ENVTL. F., May/June 2016, at 56, 56
(citing the development fee structure of area-wide habitat conservation plans (HCPs) in
California and Nevada).
95

Id.

96

50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(1)–(13).
Id. § 223.203(b)(13).
98 Id. § 223.203(b)(12).
97
99
100

Id.

Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 146–50 (explaining how 4(d) rules can
promote effective recovery by managing habitat over a large enough area to provide both a
sufficient range for the species and economic development). In contrast to ESA section 4(d)
tools that may be limited to land-use jurisdictions, anybody, including a small-lot owner, can
apply for an incidental take permit. See Lynn Scarlett, Bigger May Sometimes Be Better, ENVTL.
F., May/June 2016, at 54, 54 (noting that only 5% of HCPs apply to areas 100,000 acres or larger).
101 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279–82, 1302 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
102 See 50 C.F.R. § 222.103(a).
103 See, e.g., FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMM’N & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE AND FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISH AND WILDLIFE 6 (2012),
https://perma.cc/Z976-94K2 [hereinafter FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT].
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IV. METHOD AND CODING
We reviewed all fifty state legislative codes as of March 15, 2017, to
identify the key provisions that relate to extinction prevention. We did not
review state constitutions, many of which address wildlife authority and
place special powers directly in commissions.104 The scope of our research
reaches to all types of species, including imperiled plants. However, we
focused on programs that prevent animal species extinctions for two related
reasons. First, states control wildlife directly through constitutional
provisions and common law tradition.105 In many states, this control is
articulated through the language of property: states assert ownership of
wildlife.106 Plants, unlike animals, are considered part of the fee simple
absolute estate.107 Therefore, landowners who hold complete title enjoy
exclusive ownership of wild plants as they do crops, timber, and minerals.
Wild animals on private land are not owned by the fee simple absolute estate
holder unless they are captured or otherwise reduced to possession.108 State
regulation of wildlife is much more extensive than regulation of plants
because, in part, it interferes less directly with private property.109
Second, federal law imposes almost no duties on private landowners to
protect listed plants. As with animals, ESA-listed plants are subject to strict
prohibitions on trade and commerce.110 But, incidental takes remain the most
controversial limitations on private landowners.111 Unlike the incidental take
prohibitions for listed animals, the section 9 duties for plants on private
property limit only activities that “remove, cut, dig up, or damage” them “in
knowing violation” of state law or in the course of a criminal trespass.112
Thus, a farmer plowing under a listed plant or a builder excavating it would
not face liability under the ESA unless some state law prohibits the activity.
Our objective to determine whether state statutes would support equal
levels of species recovery as the ESA does not require deep analysis of state
plant conservation statutes, which already provide the only solid in situ

104
105
106
107

E.g., FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 9; ARK. CONST. amend. 35, § 1.
See Kleppe, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976).
Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 78, at 1462, 1488–1504.
See, e.g., Clarke v. Alstores Realty Corp., 527 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“At

common law, vegetation which grew from perennial roots without the aid of human care and
cultivation . . . was considered as pertaining to realty.”); see also S. REP. NO. 100-240, at 12
(1987) (“[L]andowners traditionally have been accorded greater rights with respect to plants
growing on their lands than with respect to animals.”).
108 E.g., Swenson v. Holsten, 783 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); see also Dale D.
Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35
ENVTL. L. 807, 849–50 (2005) (summarizing the relationship between the common law property
rights of landowners and control over wildlife).
109 Congress also justified the limited ESA section 9 prohibitions on listed plants based on
the traditional rights of landowners. S. REP. NO. 100-240, at 12 (1987).
110 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (2012).
111 See, e.g., RANDY T. SIMMONS, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1
(2002), https://perma.cc/SZQ8-UEAL.
112 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B).
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protection for privately owned plants.113 The one exception is where privateland activity requires a federal permit (e.g., filling a wetland). In that case,
the ESA section 7 duty to avoid jeopardy to any species would trigger
limitations in the service of plant conservation.114
States may have a patchwork of statutes relevant to protecting
imperiled animals, so we searched codes rather than session laws in order to
evaluate the entire, currently applicable legislative program.115 Generally the
scope of code titles and agencies dealing with “wildlife” or “fish and wildlife”
extends to all animals.116 We used the Westlaw117 database but made minimal
use of search terms. In general, state code contents are clearly outlined and
the best method of finding the relevant legislation is to look at titles
pertaining to “conservation,” “natural resources,” “fish & wildlife,” or
“wildlife.” We often used the Westlaw search function to dive right into
legislation dealing with “endangered species” and then looked at other
chapter contents within the code title to ensure that we had identified all
relevant legislation. A few state programs to prevent extinctions use terms
other than “endangered.”118 For those states, we turned to the code’s table of
contents to find the titles and chapters where relevant law would likely be
codified. However, an overwhelming majority of states call the most
imperiled category of species listed by their agencies “endangered.”
Many state codes contain a variety of sections defining key terms.
There may be a broadly applicable definitions section for the code itself and
a more specific definitions section applicable to a title. In analyzing
definitions, we always used the most specific definition we could find,
starting with the section, and then moving up the hierarchy of the legislative
code structure to subchapter, chapter, subtitle, title, etc. While the names of
the levels of code organization vary, our search principle did not: we used
the most narrowly applicable scope in coding definitions. This is consistent
with the common canon of statutory construction that specific provisions
trump general ones in legislation.119

113 See DEFS. OF WILDLIFE & CTR. FOR WILDLIFE LAW, STATE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 25–26 (1998) (discussing state conservation statutes that provide
protection for privately owned plants).
114 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
115 Some state endangered species statutes contained programs that expired. For instance,
the California Endangered Species Act originally required state agencies to consult on the
effects of state action on state-listed species. See 1984 Cal. Stat. 4243, 4248; CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE § 2096 (West 1998). Though extended through 1998, the legislature ultimately allowed the
consultation program to expire. See 1993 Cal. Stat. 2107.
116 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(8) (“‘[F]ish or wildlife’ means any member of the animal
kingdom . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 2-149.1 (2017) (providing that “wildlife” means all animals).
117 Westlaw Next is a registered trademark. WESTLAW NEXT, Registration No. 3,986,538.
118 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-131 (2017) (defining “protected species” as “a species of
animal life which the department shall have designated as a protected species and shall have
made subject to the protection of this article”); see also id. § 27-3-132 (identifying species
subject to special protections as “protected species” as a result of being “rare, unusual, or in
danger of extinction”).
119 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 275 (2000);
see Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1999).
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Our method evaluated only legislation. Many states with very little
legislation or few protections for species may nonetheless have extensive
and effective state regulatory programs that emerge from particular agencies
or administrations. Conversely, some states with seemingly strong statutory
protections may fail to implement or enforce key provisions.120 Management
plans, administrative rules, and cooperative agreements are all important
aspects of state conservation programs.121 Yet, except for statutory mandates
to prepare recovery plans for listed species, they fall largely outside the
scope of our study. Moreover, California’s Natural Community Conservation
Planning Act,122 though not an imperiled species law, goes further than any
state in planning for conservation of ecosystems on which species depend.123
As early as 1973, the disparity between legislation protecting imperiled
species (then limited to less than twenty states)124 and administrative
programs (established by thirty-five states)125 highlighted the limitations of a
statutes-only review as a barometer of state commitment to extinction
prevention.126 Nonetheless, legislation is important as enduring and binding
instructions to state agencies. It is the strongest foundation upon which
states can enhance their recovery programs. Legally, state legislation has
served as the prime basis for delegating federal authority to state programs
under pollution-control statutes.127 It would serve the same function should
Congress heed the calls to amend the ESA to delegate greater regulatory
authority to states.
V. RESULTS
All but four state legislative codes contain some program to protect in
some way designated imperiled animals, by which we mean animal species
that are on the verge of extinction within the state. Four states, Alabama,
Arkansas, West Virginia, and Wyoming, have no general imperiled species
legislation, though they have SWAPs that address SGCNs.128 Another state,

120 E.g., infra note 244 and accompanying text (noting Massachusetts has not designated any
areas subject to a stringent program prohibiting alteration of significant habitat).
121 See Martha Williams, Lessons from the Wolf Wars: Recovery v. Delisting Under the
Endangered Species Act, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 106, 144 (2016).
122 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800–2835 (West 2017).
123 See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 95–101 (describing how the Natural
Community Conservation Planning program works).
124 Susan George & William J. Snape III, State Endangered Species Acts, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 344, 346 (Donald C. Baur & WM. Robert Irvin eds.,
2d ed. 2010) (providing that sixteen states possessed imperiled species legislation in 1973);
Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Federalism under the Endangered Species Act, in THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 3, 11 (providing that seventeen
states possessed imperiled species legislation in 1973).
125 S. REP. NO. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2992–93.
126 See id. (discussing “extensive [state] programs” protecting endangered species and their
habitat).
127 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (requiring EPA to approve a state’s CWA
permit program if state law “provide[s] adequate authority to carry out” such a program).
128 See infra tbl.1.
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Idaho, possesses legislation on “Species Conservation” with precise
definitions,129 but its only function appears to be facilitating ESA species
delisting in Idaho.130 We judged the Idaho legislation to constitute an
imperiled species law because it concerns planning for federal hand off of
endangered species once delisted. Delisting generally requires some habitat
and population improvement for the listed species.131 The Idaho law
concerns itself only with writing plans and strategies.132 No Idaho legislation
offers any special regulatory protection to imperiled species.133 Effective
state legislation would prevent federal listing in the first place rather than
focus solely on delisting species that have declined to the point of requiring
federal protection.134 Nonetheless, we employed an inclusive approach for
identifying state imperiled species laws. Sources disagree about how many
states have enacted “endangered species” statutes, but we hesitate to
conclude that minor disparities between our findings and other studies
reflect changes to legislation rather than differences in coding judgments.135

A. Domains of Protection and Recovery Plans
The domain of species protected under state imperiled species laws
varies. Of the forty-six states with imperiled species laws, Idaho and Utah
protect nothing other than ESA-listed species. However, unlike Idaho, Utah
legislation offers a modicum of protection through a ban on illegal
possession of protected wildlife.136 Of the remaining forty-four states, most
129 IDAHO CODE § 36-2401 (2017) (defining endangered, threatened, candidate, and listed
species as including only species threatened pursuant to federal law).
130 See id. §§ 36-2402 to -2405 (establishing a delisting advisory team that is charged with
developing a delisting management plan).
131 See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION (2017),
https://perma.cc/W2PN-WWFA (listing “acquiring and restoring habitat” and “breeding species
in captivity to release them into their historic range” as tools for recovering threatened and
endangered species).
132 IDAHO CODE § 36-2401. The Idaho “species conservation strategy” is a management plan
“that describes the species needs in terms of habitat needs, population size, distribution and
connectivity. The strategy shall include voluntary, landowner-based incentives and measures to
achieve the management or conservation goals.” Id. § 36-2401(10). Delisting management plans
“shall provide for the management and conservation of the species once it is delisted, and
contain sufficient safeguards to protect the health, safety, private property and economic wellbeing of the citizens of the state of Idaho.” Id. § 36-2404(1).
133 The Idaho legislature limits the reach of the “Species Conservation” chapter by noting
that it shall not “be interpreted as granting the department of fish and game with new or
additional authority.” Id. § 36-2405(7). Idaho, like most states, already bans possession of
wildlife except where legally taken. Id. § 36-401. Because many listed animals would require
state license for taking, there remains this indirect protection. But, it is not special to imperiled
or even federally listed species.
134 Michael J. Bean, A Statute Reborn, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 2017, at 31, 34.
135 George and Snape counted forty-six states with endangered species legislation in 2010, in
contrast to Arha and Thompson’s count of forty-five in 2011. Compare George & Snape III,
supra note 124, at 347, with Arha & Thompson, Jr., supra note 124, at 11. More recently, a study
concluded that all states but West Virginia and Wyoming have endangered species laws. See
Camacho et al., supra note 26, at 10,838.
136 UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4.5 (West 2017).
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either automatically include federally listed species137 or require state
determinations of whether federally listed species should be added to their
protective domain.138 However, all forty-four states also list species that are
imperiled within the state but not protected under the ESA.
Some states without specific imperiled species regulatory protections
nonetheless have programs to list species under various categories, fund and
engage in conservation action, and prohibit certain takes under general
authority. For instance, Arizona has no discrete imperiled species statute.
But Arizona’s legislative code defines endangered, threatened, and sensitive
species;139 it creates a special funding source for conservation;140 and applies
its general wildlife take prohibition to endangered species,141 with penalties
equal to those for illegal takes of trophy game.142 Other state legislation is not
self-implementing, merely empowering a state agency to make rules as it
deems necessary to protect imperiled species.143 Our inclusive approach
results in coding more state imperiled species legislation than we would if
we limited ourselves to just those states possessing the key regulatory
elements we associate with the ESA. Table 1 displays the basic attributes of
state imperiled species legislation.

137
138

E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:1904(A) (2017).
E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-960(b)(3) (2017).

139

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-296(2)–(4) (2017).

140

Id. § 17-298.
Id. § 17-101(20).
Id. § 17-314(A)(6).
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132(b) (2017).

141
142
143
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State

Number
of
imperiled
categories

Taxa
below
species
included?

Invertebrates
included?

Plants
included?

Status
reporting
frequency
(yr)

Recovery
plan
mandate?

Habitat
protection
provision
for listed
taxa?

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

-1
3
-3
2
3
1
2
1
4
4
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
3
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
2
3
3
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
3
1
2
2
2
1
-2
--

-Y
Y
-Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
-N
--

-Some
Some
-Some
Some
All
Unclear
All
All
All
All
All
Some
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
Some
All
Some
All
Unclear
All
Some
Some
Some
Some
All
All
All
Some
Some
All
Some
All
Some
Some
Some
All
Some
All
-Some
--

-N
N
-Y
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
-Y
--

-2
--5
5
5
-1
-1
-5
2
2
5
----5
2
3
2
-2
----2
-----5
--2
2
2
---------

-N
N
-N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
-N
--

-Y
N
-N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
-N
--

Table 1: Domains of Protection and Recovery Plans in State Imperiled Species Legislation
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The ESA geographic scope of concern for imperilment lists a species if
it is endangered in “all or a significant portion of its range.”144 This extends
ESA protection to a species even if just the U.S. portion of a species is at
risk.145 Analogously, almost every state with imperiled species protection
legislation includes species based on the risk of extirpation within the
geographic boundaries of the state.146 But, some other species, especially
those on the ESA list, are also included in thirty-four state lists without
consideration of their status within state boundaries.147 Twenty-one state
laws parallel the ESA in maintaining and protecting two lists of species:
threatened and endangered.148 Fourteen additional states maintain a single
list of protected species.149 Eleven other states maintain three or more lists,
but generally only one or two categories of species receive regulatory
protection.150 Twenty-seven states list taxa narrower than biological species,
such as subspecies or distinct population segments, as does the ESA.151 The
other states list only taxa at the species level.152
The types of animals eligible for listing defy the “charismatic
megafauna” stereotype of the species lawmakers care about protecting.
Obscure, comical species names, such as the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly
(Rhaphiomidas terminates abdominalis), have been emphasized to ridicule
the comprehensive extinction-protection mission of the ESA.153 One
legislator went so far as to state that, in 1973, “no member of Congress could
envision application” of the ESA to “flies, mussels, snails.”154 Yet, when
Congress enacted the ESA, it was already evident that the extinction

144

ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012).
Final Policy on Interpretation of the Phrase “Significant Portion of Its Range” in the
Endangered Species Act’s Definitions of “Endangered Species” and “Threatened Species,” 79
Fed. Reg. 37,578, 37,592 (July 1, 2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. I and II) (noting that
national boundaries can be the basis for designating a distinct population segment whose range
ends at the border).
146 George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 347.
145

147
148

See id.
E.g., 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (2016) (defining the two categories of endangered species

and threatened species in a fashion similar to the ESA).
149 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 23:2A-3(c) (West 2017) (establishing just one listed category,
“endangered species”).
150 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-331(2), (8)–(9) (2017) (listing three categories and defining
endangered species and threatened species in a fashion similar to the ESA but also including a
listing category of “special concern species” that require monitoring but not protection from
takes).
151 E.g., IOWA CODE § 481B.1(8) (2017) (defining species to include subspecies and “smaller
taxa in common spatial arrangement that interbreed or cross-pollinate when mature”); see also
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012).
152 See supra tbl.1.
153 Eileen Campbell, The Case of the $150,000 Fly, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Apr. 26, 2006),
https://perma.cc/S75Y-84BW.
154 James V. Hansen, Endangered Economies, 16 F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 46
(2001). For a discussion on legislators’ attempts to rewrite the history of taxonomic breadth
from the ESA, see Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered
Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 467–68 (2004).
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problem extended to invertebrates.155 Most (forty-four of forty-six) state
imperiled species laws clearly allow at least some invertebrates on their
lists.156 We found two state laws ambiguous about the inclusion of
invertebrates,157 or lacking definitions of covered species.158 Many states do
not exclude insect pests,159 a category the ESA authorizes the Services to
leave off of lists when their protection “would present an overwhelming and
overriding risk to man.”160 Some states exclude other pests, such as “old
world rats and mice of the family Muridae of the order Rodentia.”161
Of the thirty-four states that protect plants, only fifteen do so under the
imperiled species portion of their legislative codes.162 The other nineteen
states have some other (often discretionary and only applicable to state
lands) plant protection provision elsewhere in their codes.163 States often
legislate plant protection under separate statutes for the same reason that
the ESA has different prohibitions for plants than animals: fee simple
absolute property holders own the plants that occur on their land.164 Many
states’ imperiled animal regulatory programs amount to little more than
takings prohibitions, which do not apply to plants.165 This might explain the
155 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 46, at 199; see also Nagle, supra note 17, at 397 (citing
Endangered Species: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong. 207 (1973)

(discussing imperiled mollusks)). Still, it was not until 1976 that FWS began listing
invertebrates. First Invertebrate Species Listed As Endangered, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://perma.cc/2H3K-X67Y (last updated June 19, 2017); e.g., Endangered Status for 159 Taxa
of Animals, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,062, 24,064 (June 14, 1976) (listing the Curtis pearlymussel among
many invertebrates added to the domain of the ESA).
156 See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 10001(71) (2017) (“any species of the animal kingdom”); MO.
REV. STAT. § 252.020(3) (2017) (“all wild birds, mammals, fish and other aquatic and amphibious
forms, and all other wild animals, regardless of classification”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 150.010(42) (2017) (“any normally undomesticated animal . . . without limitations”); cf. ALASKA
STAT. § 16.20.190(a) (2017) (including fish or wildlife, but defining neither term); id.
§ 16.05.940(12) (defining “fish” to include aquatic invertebrates, but not defining wildlife); CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE § 45 (West 2017) (defining “fish” to include mollusks, crustaceans, and
invertebrates—although it is ambiguous whether that is just marine invertebrates or all
invertebrates); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 68.001(1) (2017) (including only mollusks and
crustaceans among the terrestrial invertebrates eligible for listing; all aquatic animals are
eligible).
157 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.584(2)(a) (2017) (describing purpose as encompassing
“fish and other vertebrate wildlife”); cf. id. § 503.585 (listing “native fish, wildlife and other
fauna”).
158 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 101 (2017) (“wildlife” undefined in code).
159 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 14-22-34-1 (2017).
160 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-8-1(1) (2017)
(defining “endangered species” to exclude insect pests).
161 WASH. REV. CODE § 77.08.010(73) (2017).
162 E.g., MINN. STAT. § 84.0895 subdiv. 1 (2017); see supra tbl.1.
163 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53C-2-202, 65A-2-3 (West 2017) (providing discretionary
authority to protect federally listed plants on state lands); see also CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§ 2062 (West 2017) (defining “endangered species” to include plants under the California
Endangered Species Act); id. § 1904 (authorizing the designation of endangered and rare native
plants under the California Native Plant Protection Act).
164 See, e.g., Falk v. Amsberry, 633 P.2d 799, 803 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
165 George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 346, 353.
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separate statutory treatment of plants. Two states, Maryland and
Pennsylvania, implement separate acts for wildlife and for fish. This
difference likely reflects a regional tradition rather than a legal distinction.
Most states rely solely on their state wildlife agencies to determine
which animals warrant protection under an imperiled species law.166 The
ESA relies on the initiative of the Services but also provides a controversial
petition process for citizens to force the Services to consider additions to,
modifications of, or removals from the federal lists.167 The petition process is
contentious because it can derail the priorities of the federal Services.168
However, it has resulted in many listings of species that are closer to
extinction than the ones the Services evaluate on their own.169 Only thirteen
state imperiled species laws expressly allow citizens to petition the
responsible agency to review the status of a listed species.170 Western states
disproportionately legislate citizen petition procedures, which is consistent
with the initiative and referendum tradition in that region.171 Other states
may provide citizens the right to petition as a matter of administrative law,
rather than within imperiled species legislation.
Imperiled species lists must be dynamic to reflect the changes in
species populations, habitat availability, and intensity of threats. Legislation
in twenty-four states requires periodic administrative updates to the status
of listed species.172 Mandates for periodic review without establishing
deadlines are less likely to be effective or enforceable than those that
specify a maximum time period between status reviews. Four states
requiring monitoring do not establish deadlines.173 Of the remaining twenty
states, the most common time periods for reporting are every two years (ten
states), followed by every five years (seven states), one year (two states),
and three years (one state).174 The ESA requires the Services to review the
status of listed species every five years,175 so twenty states meet or exceed
that standard for reporting. Though many states commit to imperiled species
166 The exception to this general rule is the thirty-seven states that automatically include in
their lists species designated by the Services as protected under the ESA. See id. at 347.
167 ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012).
168 See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and
Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 336 (2010).
169 Id. at 359, 361, 378.
170 E.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2071 (West 2017).
171 David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (1995). More than half (nine of thirteen) of
the states with imperiled species legislation providing citizens with listing petition rights occur
in the nineteen states in the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies’ western region, which
extends from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. About Us, W. ASS’N FISH & WILDLIFE
AGENCIES, https://perma.cc/5UPN-Z3KY (last visited Jan. 27, 2018); Members, W. ASS’N FISH &
WILDLIFE AGENCIES, https://perma.cc/32MX-3LBC (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
172 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4 (2017) (providing that the director of the agency
“shall review” imperiled species lists every five years).
173 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:2A-4 (West 2017) (“The commissioner shall periodically review
the State list of endangered species and may by regulation amend the list making such additions
or deletions as are deemed appropriate.”).
174 See supra tbl.1.
175 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (2012).
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monitoring in SWAPs, which are revised every ten years,176 states identify
species-specific information as among their greatest unmet needs.177
Particularly because many states within a region may have the same species
on their lists, coordination among states would improve understanding of
species status at both the regional and national level.178 The ESA already
mandates that the Services implement a system in cooperation with states
for status monitoring of delisted species.179
Recovery plans typically set the benchmarks for moving a species out
of an imperiled category. The ESA requires a plan for all listed species
except those whose recovery would not be advanced by one.180 The Services
frequently collaborate with state agencies in recovery planning and may
include other appropriate people on recovery planning teams.181 States have
been particularly critical of tardy issuance of federal recovery plans.182
Congress is currently considering bills that would allow states to claim
exclusive authority to develop or implement recovery plans for intrastate
species.183 Our research suggests that few states have experience with
directing recovery planning. Only three states’ laws require that agencies
prepare recovery plans for their own imperiled species.184 We coded
generously, and included in our tally of recovery-plan mandates even New
Mexico’s provision, which requires only the development of recovery plans
“to the extent practicable.”185 However, we excluded Maine’s recovery plan
requirement because it applies only to a narrow class of imperiled species,
those that will be conserved using “transplantation, introduction or
reintroduction.”186 Many state statutes provide general guidance about
developing an imperiled species program that requires relevant agencies to
“plan” for recovery.187 However, we did not consider these common

176
177
178

Id. § 669c(d)(1)(D)(vi).
Meretsky et al., supra note 35, at 973.
Id. at 973–74.

179

16 U.S.C. § 1533(g).

180

Id. § 1533(f)(1).
Id. § 1533(f)(2). The Services’ cooperative federalism policy is to utilize “the expertise

181

and solicit the information and participation of State agencies in all aspects of the recovery
planning process for all species under their jurisdiction.” Revised Interagency Cooperative
Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg.
8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. IV).
182 See, e.g., WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 5–6 (recommending completion of
recovery plans within one year of listing and calling for clearer recovery goals).
183 See Endangered Species Management Self-Determination Act, S. 935, 115th Cong.
§ 4(j)(2)(B) (2017); H.R. 2134, 115th Cong. § 4(j)(2)(B) (2017).
184 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-960 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-40.1 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113333 (2017).
185 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-40.1(G) (also requiring that final plans be prepared within
two years after listing).
186 ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12804(1)(D) (2017).
187 E.g., 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/11(a) (2016) (stating that the department “shall actively plan
and implement a program for the conservation of endangered and threatened species, by means
which should include published data search, research, management, cooperative agreements
with other agencies, identification, protection and acquisition of essential habitat, support of
beneficial legislation, issuance of grants from appropriated funds, and education of the public”).
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provisions to compel recovery plans unless the legislation expressly
identified a recovery plan as a particular type of mandatory document.
Critical habitat under the ESA provides limited additional protections
for listed species only through its narrow applicability in the consultation
process. In addition to proscribing jeopardy, ESA section 7 demands that
federal agency actions not result in adverse modification of critical habitat.188
Critical habitat is irrelevant to section 9 prohibitions. Yet it plays an outsized
role in opposition to the ESA when landowners find their property within
mapped areas designated for critical habitat, and potentially subject to the
adverse modification test in seeking federal permits.189 Most state
legislatures wish to avoid such controversy. But, habitat degradation is the
leading threat to U.S. imperiled species.190 We coded generously to include
all habitat-protecting provisions for listed taxa, even if no agency formally
maps covered habitat as the Services must do under the ESA, and regardless
of how the protection applies. For instance, we counted as a habitatprotection provision Alaska legislation mandating commissioners “take
measures to preserve the natural habitat” of imperiled species.191 Still, only
five states legislate habitat protection for imperiled species.192

B. Interagency Consultation
Consultation between the Services and other federal agencies under the
ESA is framed as “interagency cooperation” in section 7 to ensure that
government actions and funding do not undermine the national policy of
extinction prevention.193 Table 2 shows similar coordination requirements
among state agencies in eleven state legislative codes.194 The northeastern
states disproportionately impose strong interagency cooperation
requirements. The strength of ESA section 7 is that it marries a detailed,
required procedure with a substantive threshold limiting agency impacts;
agency actions must not jeopardize the continued existence of listed species
or adversely modify critical habitat.195 We did not categorize as interagency
cooperation state legislation that merely requires cooperation without
188

ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).

189

See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 986

(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a party “must consult with the appropriate expert wildlife
agency before any” action can be taken regarding critical habitat).
190 Wilcove et al., supra note 74, at 607–09 (noting habitat degradation is a threat to 85% of
imperiled species); see also NOSS ET AL., supra note 74, at 2, 5–7 & fig.1.1; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 74, at 7, 35–38, 40.
191 ALASKA STAT. § 16.20.185 (2017).
192 Cf. George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 348–49 (tallying six states with critical habitat
designation provisions employing a coding definition that appears closer to the ESA approach).
193 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
194 Cf. George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 352 (tallying eight states with interagency
consultation requirements); Camacho et al., supra note 26, at 10,839 (tallying twelve states with
interagency consultation requirements). Our tally of state legislation for interagency
cooperation includes Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
195 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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specifying either a procedure or a substantive threshold of impacts to be
avoided.196 Of the eleven states requiring interagency cooperation, all impose
some kind of substantive threshold beyond which adverse impacts to
imperiled species will not be tolerated.197 Most of the eleven states adopt the
same substantive jeopardy standard as the ESA itself.198
Like the ESA, most states have an exemption or variance procedure to
allow otherwise legal, but substantively barred, state actions to proceed.199
Three of the eleven states do not establish any particular procedures for
state agencies to determine whether their actions, programs, or grants might
cross the threshold into impermissible adverse impacts on imperiled
species.200 Some state laws, as with the ESA, clearly include agency
permitting as an action subject to substantive standards.201 This is important
because state permitting decisions are likely to most directly address private
habitat-disturbing developments. However, other state legislation is
ambiguous about whether the scope of agency actions subject to
interagency consultation includes permitting.202

196 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-570 (West 2017) (mandating cooperation but without a
procedure to formalize cooperation or a substantive threshold). Other states require
interagency coordination on only narrowly circumscribed matters. E.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 379.2291(4)(c) (2017) (establishing discretionary interagency coordination for establishing
road speed limits to protect listed species).
197 E.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806(1)(A) (2017) (prohibiting state agencies or municipal
governments from permitting, funding, or carrying out projects that will significantly alter
designated habitat or violate protection guidelines for an imperiled species).
198 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-807(3) (2017) (providing that all state agencies must “insure
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or modification
of habitat of such species which is determined by the commission to be critical”); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 195D-5(b)(2) (2017) (providing that all state agencies must “ensure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of
[imperiled] species”). Hawaii, however, like most states, neither designates critical habitat nor
includes it as part of the substantive threshold.
199 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(1)–(10) (providing the federal agency action exemption
process and standards), with, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806 (providing a variance from the
substantive limitations on state action after a public hearing and commissioner certification
that the action would not pose a significant risk of extinction).
200 See infra tbl.2.
201 E.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806.
202 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(a) (2017).
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State

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

No consultation
requirement

Substantive
standard only

107

Procedural and
substantive
standards

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 2: Interagency Coordination Requirements in State Imperiled Species Legislation
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Among the eight states with both procedural and substantive elements
of interagency cooperation, there are some strong provisions that can serve
as models for others seeking to strengthen imperiled species conservation.203
For instance, Massachusetts requires action agencies to “use all practicable
means and measures to avoid or minimize damage to [state-listed]
species.”204 Wisconsin’s substantive requirement for state agency action is
even broader, prohibiting jeopardy to the species and adverse modification
to critical habitat, but also jeopardy to “the whole plant–animal community
of which [the species] is a part.”205 Wisconsin also requires that the state
“alleviate, to the maximum extent practicable under the circumstances, any
potential adverse effect” on the state-listed species when a “taking” occurs.206
This provision mirrors the incidental take statement program of ESA section
7.207

C. Prohibited Acts and Permits
Prohibited acts of the kind banned by ESA section 9 vary from state to
state. The term “take” has deep roots in wildlife law and originally applied
solely to active pursuit through such activities as hunting, fishing, and
trapping.208 Most state imperiled species legislation bans take, but that fact is
unrevealing because states define the term differently (or not at all).
Moreover, legislation itself may not reveal the full extent of activities
affected by take bans. For instance, the ESA definition of take, by itself,
does not expressly reveal whether habitat destruction falls under the
prohibition.209 Instead, Service rulemaking is the key authority for extending
the ESA take prohibition to certain kinds of habitat modification.210 Because,
overall, the most important role states could serve in endangered species
recovery is controlling land-use degradation of habitat, this is the single
most important category for indicating how well states could contribute to
greater cooperative federalism in the ESA. As previously noted, some state
legislation does not even ban killing an imperiled species but merely
empowers agencies to implement such a ban.211 Because our study did not
analyze agency rules or enforcement proceedings, there remains ambiguity

203 E.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806(1)(A) (prohibiting state agencies or municipal
governments from permitting, funding, or carrying out projects that will significantly alter
designated habitat or violate protection guidelines for an imperiled species).
204 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4 (2017).
205 WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(a).
206 Id. § 29.604(6r)(d).
207 See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012).
208 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *411 (“[E]very man . . . has an equal right of
pursuing, and taking to his own use, all such creatures as are ferae naturae . . . .”), quoted in
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); see also supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
210 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016).
211 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132 (2017) (empowering a board to make rules to protect
imperiled species, but limiting them to “to the regulation of the capture, killing, or selling of
protected species and the protection of the habitat of the species on public lands”).

7_TOJCI.FISCHMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

STATE IMPERILED SPECIES LEGISLATION

3/3/2018 10:00 AM

109

associated with the actual extent to which prohibited acts provisions
actually protect state-listed species.212 However, we were able to distinguish
four different types of prohibitions in statutes: 1) trafficking; 2) purposeful
actions designed to capture or kill wildlife; 3) broader bans suggesting
habitat concerns; and 4) a special category of prohibitions that include
“lesser acts,” such as “disturbing” wildlife, which one influential court
decision interpreted to ban significant habitat modification.213
The most common category of prohibited acts in state statutes is
trafficking. Trafficking is illegal commercial trading, which legislation
typically controls through limitations on the ability to import, export, sell,
buy, offer to sell or buy, deliver, carry, or transport wildlife.214 Even in the
United States, trafficking remains a threat to many imperiled species, such
as freshwater turtles desired in Asian medicinal and food markets, or fish
harvested for edible roe.215 Table 3 shows that legislation in forty-one states
prohibits imperiled species trafficking. The nine states with no trafficking
prohibition for imperiled species include the four states with no imperiled
species protective legislation (Alabama, Arkansas, West Virginia, and
Wyoming) and Idaho (which concerns itself only with promoting federal
delisting). The remaining four states (Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and North
Dakota) contain other sorts of prohibitions designed to protect imperiled
species from illegal commercial activity. For instance, Arizona’s general
legislative provisions for “fish and game” specify the very highest civil
penalties for possession of illegally taken trophy or endangered animals.216
Most states prohibit selling, buying, or possessing any wild animal (or
animal part) without a permit or some other permission from a state
agency.217 Most states have some sort of penalties for illegal commerce
generally.

212 For example, Maryland legislation prohibits take, which it defines similarly to the ESA
definition: “[H]arass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct.” MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 10-2A-01(k), 10-2A-05
(LexisNexis 2017). However, one would need to read the agency regulation to learn that it
interprets harm to include some forms of significant habitat modification. MD. CODE REGS.
08.03.08.01(6)(b) (2017).
213 Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
214 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (prohibiting most of these acts).
215 See Inclusion of Four Native U.S. Freshwater Turtle Species in Appendix III of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 81
Fed. Reg. 32,664, 32,667–668 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 23) (describing
trafficking threats to the turtles); NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FINAL RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE
SHORTNOSE STURGEON 45 (1998) (describing poaching for endangered shortnosed sturgeon roe),
https://perma.cc/847L-XZ42.
216 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-314 (2017).
217 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 379.3762 (2017) (generally prohibiting personal possession of Florida
wildlife without a permit, subject to certain exceptions).
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The second category of prohibitions applies to hunting and other
purposeful actions (and usually intent to act) to reduce an imperiled species
to possession (i.e., capture or kill). The common law of wildlife typically
required this kind of effort in order for a person to claim ownership in an
animal or animal part.218 The key phrases expressing this active pursuit are
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.219 This roughly
corresponds to the ESA section 9 prohibitions except for “harm” and
“harass,” which lend themselves to broader interpretations embracing
incidental effects.220 Other commonly occurring terms in this purposeful
category under state law include fish, harvest, snare, and net.221 If a statute
required purposeful intent (e.g., employing words of direct action, such as
kill or pursue), we coded it for active, intent-driven prohibition.222 Actions
intended to kill or wound an animal remain a threat for imperiled species
such as prairie dogs and wolves.223
Purposeful actions, and their attempts, to take wild animals (other than
those considered pests or vermin) are generally prohibited under state
wildlife law, which typically bans people from engaging in the activities
without a license.224 States will not offer licenses to pursue or hunt most
nongame wildlife, which compose the vast majority of animals on state
imperiled species lists.225 In order to home in on imperiled species programs,
we coded only special prohibitions applying to imperiled species. This rules
out the four states with no programs and Idaho.226 In addition to those states,
five others have no special prohibitions on active pursuit of imperiled
species.227 Colorado’s imperiled species law bans “take” in a provision that
otherwise only addresses trafficking.228 It defines “take” in a generally
applicable part of the “Parks and Wildlife” title as “to acquire possession.”229

218 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (ruling that “actual bodily seizure
is not indispensable to acquire right to, or possession of wild beasts; but that, on the contrary,
the mortal wounding of such beasts, by one not abandoning his pursuit, may, with the utmost
propriety, be deemed possession of him; since thereby, the pursuer manifests an unequivocal
intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use, has deprived him of his natural
liberty, and brought him within his certain control”).
219

See id.

220

ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016).

221

E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-2 (West 2017).
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132(b) (2017) (prohibiting “capture” and “killing”); UTAH CODE

222

ANN. § 23-13-2(48)(a) (“hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture, possess, angle, seine, trap, or kill
any protected wildlife”).
223 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for the Mexican
Wolf, 80 Fed. Reg. 2488, 2496 (Jan. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Reclassify the Utah Prairie Dog as Threatened,
with Special Rule to Allow Regulated Taking, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,330, 22,330–31 (May 29, 1984) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
224 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-1(1).
225 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-314 (2017) (imposing civil penalties for illegally taking,
wounding, killing or possessing nongame animals and endangered species animals).
226 See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text.
227 Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota, and Rhode Island. See supra tbl.3.
228 COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-2-105(3)–(4) (2017).
229 Id. § 33-1-102(43).
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We tallied this ambiguous provision as a purposeful pursuit for killing or
collecting. Four states ban commerce in imperiled species but not active
pursuit.230
The third and fourth categories of prohibitions are those that may or do
prohibit certain forms of habitat degradation. Ordinarily, people impair
habitat for imperiled species in the service of other, economically
productive purposes. Therefore, the key interpretive question is whether
legislative prohibitions apply to harms or disturbances that are incidental to
an otherwise lawful purpose, such as farming, logging, or real estate
development. Unfortunately, this important issue is difficult to code because
of ambiguity over what text might actually ban incidental adverse impacts
on imperiled species. For instance, the definition of Colorado’s take ban
expressly excludes “the accidental wounding or killing of wildlife by a motor
vehicle, vessel, or train.”231 One could interpret the exclusion to mean that
other forms of accidental wounding of wildlife are prohibited implicitly
under the expressio unius canon of construction.232 But an agency is likely
not compelled to make that interpretation.233 We did not count Colorado
among states with legislation prohibiting incidental take through habitat
degradation because we are interested in clearer legislative judgments
rather than mere openings for agency discretion that could possibly be used
to regulate incidental takes.
Other state statutes prohibit take and define the term to include “harm,”
the verb that the Services interpret to include certain forms of significant
habitat modification.234 Some states agencies make the same interpretation
of “harm.”235 Other states do not make regulatory interpretations of “harm.”236
A recent study from the Center for Land, Environment, and Natural
Resources of the University of California, Irvine School of Law reviewed
state regulations and found five states that interpret terms of their
prohibitions to ban forms of significant habitat alteration.237 We found nine

230 Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and Rhode Island. See supra tbl.3; see, e.g., MO. REV.
STAT. § 252.240(1)–(2) (2017) (prohibiting trafficking of imperiled species). Missouri bans active
pursuit of wildlife without a permit but has no provision that applies specifically to imperiled
species. See MO. REV. STAT. § 252.040.
231 COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-102(43).
232 ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 119, at 375 (defining expressio unius as “expression of
one thing suggests the exclusion of others”); see, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 114–19 (2001) (holding that a statutory provision that excludes specifically listed
employment contracts indicates that the law implicitly includes all other contracts).
233 An agency might decide that the legislative history indicates that the transportation
sector objected to the broad language and received an exemption because it asked for
clarification.
234 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016); see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-802(6) (2017).
235 E.g., MD. CODE REGS. 08.03.08.01(6)(b) (2017) (“Harm includes an act that significantly
modifies or degrades a habitat thereby killing or injuring wildlife . . . .”).
236 See, e.g., 163 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 4-004 (2017) (providing no regulatory interpretation of
“harm”).
237 Camacho et al, supra note 26, at 10,841.
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state statutory definitions of take that include “harm,”238 and all but one
would be amenable to administrative interpretations that include incidental
habitat impacts.239
Only one state, Massachusetts, clearly prohibits habitat degradation, at
least in specially designated areas. Massachusetts bans take, which it
defines to include “disrupt the nesting, breeding, feeding or migratory
activity,” “harass,” and “harm.”240 Massachusetts’s implementing agency does
protect habitat through this provision.241 But, in addition to any incidental
take liability, the statute also declares that “no person may alter significant
habitat.”242 The geographic extent of “significant habitat” is limited to
specially designated areas, akin to the ESA’s “critical habitat.”243 However,
the state has failed to designate any “significant habitat” to implement the
direct ban on habitat alteration.244
Though it does not mention habitat, Maine defines “take” to include
“the act or omission that results in the death of any endangered or
threatened species,” even if unintentional.245 This prohibition is similar to the
Services’ interpretation of the ESA ban to include “an act which actually
kills . . . wildlife . . . [which] may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills.”246 The Maine incidental take permit
provision leads us to interpret the prohibition to include at least some
incidental habitat degradation.247 Nevada bans imperiled species from being
“captured, removed, or destroyed at any time by any means, except under
special permit.”248 Nevada legislation does not expressly provide for an
incidental take permit, but the agency director does appear to have authority

238 Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, and
North Carolina prohibit harm to imperiled species. See supra tbl.3.
239 North Carolina’s statute defines prohibited “take” as “[a]ll operations during,
immediately preparatory, and immediately subsequent to an attempt, whether successful or not,
to capture, kill, pursue, hunt, or otherwise harm or reduce to possession.” N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113-130(7) (2017). Therefore, we concluded that “harm” in this context excludes incidental
habitat alteration. The state regulations support this interpretation. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE
10I.0102 (2017).
240 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, §§ 1–2 (2017).
241 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.11–.26 (2017); see Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d
875, 881–83 (Mass. 2014) (explaining how the habitat protection program works in the context
of take permits).
242 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 2; see Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 881–83, 887 nn.8 & 9 (explaining
that the prohibition on alteration of significant habitat provides additional protection separate
from the take prohibition, though both operate in practice through mitigation in permit
conditions).
243 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 1.
244 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.99.
245 ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12808 (2017).
246 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016). Though the Services define harm as resulting from an “act,” they
define the “harass” element of the ESA definition of take as including omissions as well. Id. On
the significance of the “omission” element in prohibited activities, see Sweet Home, 515 U.S.
687, 716–20 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247 See ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12808 (including both acts and omissions that result in death of
endangered or threatened species in the definition of “take”).
248 NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.585 (2017).
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to issue one as a “special permit.”249 The legislation, which does not define
“destroyed,” is thus ambiguous as to incidental takes; neither the prohibition
nor the permitting directly addresses anything about incidental intent or
habitat degradation. We coded only the Massachusetts and Maine legislative
bans on incidental habitat impairment to be at least as stringent as the
Services’ interpretation of harm.
Four states share prohibitions of “take” where the legislation defines
the term to include “lesser acts,” such as “disturbing” and other verbs.250 This
is our fourth category. One of those states, New York, interpreted this
formulation to include at least some habitat modifications. The widely cited
case of State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc.251 upheld an injunction against a
mine that erected a fence to keep state-listed rattlesnakes from making their
seasonal migration to their summer range on mine property.252 Relying on the
“plain and obvious” meaning of the statute, as well as legislative history that
indicated an intent to complement the ESA, the state appellate court stated
that “habitat interference” may sometimes rise to the level of a state-banned
“take.”253 This raises the possibility that—in addition to New York, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Vermont—other states may ban incidental takes
under their legislation.
The mere presence of an ambiguous term, such as “harm,” “harass,” or
“worry,” does not indicate whether the state legislation actually sustains the
same regulatory or judicial interpretation as the ESA. On the other hand, the
absence of these and like terms generally precludes enforcement against
otherwise lawful habitat-disturbing activities.254 Therefore, we conclude that,
at most, thirteen state imperiled species laws could be clearly construed to
prohibit incidental takes, but may not necessarily be interpreted in that
manner.255

249
250

Id.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:1 (2017); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0103 (McKinney
2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 2-118 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4001(23) (2017).
251 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
252 Id. at 80, 84. On the importance of the decision, see generally Christopher A. Amato &
Robert Rosenthal, Endangered Species Protection in New York After State v. Sour Mountain
Realty, Inc., 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117 (2001).
253 Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d at 81–83.
254 E.g., Animal Rights Front, Inc. v. Jacques, 869 A.2d 679, 681–82 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005)
(rejecting application of state imperiled species legislation to private habitat disturbance based
on the clear meaning of the statute); Opinion No. 94-605, 78 Cal. Attorney Gen. 137, 139, 142
(1995) (interpreting the California legislative prohibition on “take, possess, purchase, or sell” as
excluding habitat modification, relying on a code definition of “take” as “hunt, pursue, catch,
capture, or kill,” or attempts). The California attorney general opinion was largely endorsed by
the court in San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. City of Moreno Valley, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
897, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (reasoning that the omission by the legislature demonstrated the
prohibition does not cover habitat modification).
255 Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, and Vermont. See supra tbl.3; supra note 239 and
accompanying text; cf. Camacho et al., supra note 26, at 10,841 (concluding that five states
clearly prohibit significant habitat modification and five state prohibitions are ambiguous but
may prohibit harm).
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Seven state laws provide specifically for incidental take permits. They
include Maine and Massachusetts, which supports our interpretation of their
statutory prohibitions.256 Like Justice Stevens in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,257 we regard the enactment of
such permit programs to indicate that legislators intended the statutory
prohibitions to include incidental takes.258 If they did not, then there would
be no need for citizens to secure permits to legally proceed with otherwise
lawful activities.259 It is difficult to imagine an effective program for
protecting imperiled species habitat without some kind of permit to allow
economic development to move forward. Some states ban incidental takes
without including either “harm” or “lesser acts” in prohibitions. For instance,
California’s imperiled species legislation prohibits take, which is defined as
“hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch,
capture, or kill.”260 California’s statutory incidental take permit program
focuses on situations where there is actually a showing of a killing or
likelihood of a killing that occurred or may occur as part of an otherwise
lawful activity.261 Only habitat degradation that results in the death of
individual members of a listed species would need an incidental take permit
to proceed legally in California.262 Nonetheless, real estate developers do
apply for permits despite the difficulties of proving an actual killing.263
Other states, such as Nevada, may permit incidental takes as a matter of
administrative discretion but do not have express legislative authority.264
Unlike Florida and Arkansas, the commission responsible for Nevada
wildlife rulemaking does not have regulatory power outside of its statutory

256 In addition to Maine and Massachusetts, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, and
Wisconsin have legislative incidental take permit programs. See supra tbl.3.
257 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
258 Id. at 700–01.
259 The important exception to this principle, noted below, is those state regulatory
commissions that possess constitutional power to prohibit actions without express legislative
authorization. See infra note 290.
260 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 86 (West 2017). California prohibits “take, possess, purchase,
or sell” in a sentence that includes other trafficking terms. Id. § 2080. California then defines
take to mean “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or
kill.” Id. § 86.
261 Id. § 2081(b); Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 222, 230–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying the take prohibition’s ban on “kill” to an
irrigation that incidentally entrapped salmon in irrigation pumps, killing the fish).
262 Sierra Club v. City of Palm Desert, No. E052300, 2012 WL 951502, at *28 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 21, 2012) (denying a claim that construction of a real estate development would result in
the killing of a bighorn sheep due to stress or habituation to people because the challengers
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection to a death of an individual
sheep).
263 See, e.g., Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 546–
47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a permit for a large-scale real estate development in the
Natomas Basin).
264 NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.585 (2017) (authorizing the commission to issue “special permits”
for take).
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authority.265 Some of the seven state laws that mandate incidental take
programs grant broad discretion to the agency and do not require habitat
conservation plans.266 Five of the seven incidental take permit provisions
expressly require a habitat conservation plan in order to receive the
permit.267 Wisconsin’s incidental take permits, for instance, closely tracks the
terms of ESA section 10 in requiring: a habitat conservation plan,
minimization and mitigation of takings impacts to the maximum extent
practicable, assurance of adequate funding for the plan, that consultation
thresholds are met, and “[a]ny other measures that the department may
determine to be necessary or appropriate.”268 Illinois’s incidental take permit
criteria similarly track the ESA program.269 Of the seven states with
legislation authorizing incidental take permits, only Hawaii, Illinois, and
Massachusetts have clear statutory prohibitions on “harm,” and none
prohibits lesser acts.270
Other types of permits, such as for public safety, scientific study, or
education are common in state codes. Only California, Hawaii, and Kansas
expressly authorize programs similar to federal safe-harbor agreements,
which provide landowners with incentives to maintain or enhance
unoccupied imperiled species habitat in exchange for a liability shield.271
Some states, such as Colorado, implement other special permit programs to
alleviate the burden on landowners to coexist with imperiled species.272
VI. DISCUSSION
Our findings support the conclusions of other researchers that, on the
whole, state imperiled species legislation is weaker than the ESA, “lacking in
regulatory teeth and policy innovation.”273 Compared to the key regulatory
265 Id. § 501.181(4) (2017) (providing the commission authority to “[e]stablish regulations
necessary to carry out” certain parts of the Nevada statutory code).
266 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 496.172(4) (2017) (mandating the agency “establish a system of
state permits for incidental taking of state-designated . . . species . . . under such terms and
conditions as the commission determines will minimize the impact on the species taken”).
267 Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 195D-4(g)
(2017); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5.5(a) (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12808-A(2) (2017); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 131A, § 5(a) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6m)(c) (2017). California’s law is a bit
convoluted because it implies that the state agency may issue incidental permits without a
habitat conservation plan, but authorizes incidental takes for actions compliant with a natural
communities conservation plan and other wildlife plans. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2081.1 (West
2017).
268 WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6m). The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issues, in
addition to individual permits, “broad incidental take” authorizations for common activities.
Incidental
Take
Permit/Authorization
(ITP/A),
WIS.
DEP’T
NAT.
RESOURCES,
https://perma.cc/D7F8-7WMC (last revised May 31, 2016).
269 See 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5.5.
270 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 195D-4; 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5.5; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 5.
271 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-962(b)(1)(B) (2017).
272 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-106 (2017) (permits to alleviate damage to property).
273 Ruhl, supra note 18, at 36; see also George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 355–56
(concluding that state legislation is far from comprehensive and needs greater authority to fill
programmatic gaps).
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programs of the ESA that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on
conservation across property and jurisdictional boundaries, state laws in
general reflect a more permissive attitude. Of the forty-six states possessing
legislation protecting imperiled animals, only eleven require interagency
consultation for state actions. Only nine prohibit harm, and only two of
those clearly prohibit incidental take. Seven state laws provide for incidental
take permits, but only five of those programs require habitat conservation
plans for permit issuance. Unless the aim of proponents of ESA delegation is
to undermine recovery, state legislative reform will need to precede greater
devolution of federal authority over imperiled species.
Though current state laws, in aggregate, would not adequately replace
the operative provisions of the ESA under cooperative federalism, some
state provisions are very strong. Particularly strong provisions from
individual states would support pilot delegation of some ESA programs.
They also provide excellent templates for legislative reform. A program that
works in another state may be a much more appealing model for state
statutory revision than duplication of the federal ESA text. The states in the
vanguard of protective imperiled species legislation are Illinois,
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin. They are the four states that both
combine procedural and substantive requirements for state agency actions
and also provide incidental take permits. The Oregon legislation is
somewhat weaker than the other three because it does not require a habitat
conservation plan for an incidental take permit. Hawaii could reasonably be
included in the vanguard states, despite its lack of a statutory procedure for
implementing its substantive interagency consultation standard, because of
its combination of a statutory harm prohibition and a statutory incidental
take permit program. In other respects, these states go beyond the ESA in
devising promising programs for species recovery.
For instance, Oregon legislation requires the state Fish and Game
Commission to adopt rules setting “quantifiable and measurable
guidelines . . . necessary to ensure the survival of [imperiled] species.”274
Those guidelines serve as the substantive standards for agency consultation.
This mandate to provide guidelines through rules is a model even for ESA
reform. Currently, under the ESA, action agencies may have little guidance
before consultation on how the Services might apply the jeopardy standard
to a particular species. Action agencies may better constrain their proposed
activities to meet the jeopardy standard if they knew quantitative thresholds
of jeopardy or adverse modification of habitat in advance. Quantifiable
standards would establish monitoring benchmarks to determine whether
effects predicted in the consultation analysis actually occurred. They could
serve as the backbone for an adaptive management program to adjust
treatments designed to prevent extinctions.275 This is because a common
274

OR. REV. STAT. § 496.182(2)(a) (2017).
Adaptive management is an iterative procedure for treating actions as experiments from
which resource managers can learn and narrow uncertainty about modeling effects over time.
See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424,
429–30 (2010) (describing adaptive management and highlighting the consensus among scholars
275
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hurdle for adaptive management success is the dearth of measurable
triggers to force reevaluation of actions, beginning another iteration of the
learning cycle.276 The Oregon provision would help cure this problem in
adaptive management practice. Also, under ESA section 9, courts have
struggled with the extent of habitat alteration that constitutes prohibited
harm. One of us has recommended that the Services themselves indicate
what extent (size and intensity) of habitat disturbance triggers the
significance threshold for harm.277 The Oregon approach, if implemented
better, may point a way forward. Currently, however, the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife has promulgated only two state-listed
species survival guidelines (out of a list containing thirty species).278
Wisconsin’s incidental take permit program includes all the conditions
present in federal law. It also includes a rare incidental take liability shield
as part of its interagency coordination program similar to the ESA incidental
take statement program, which has been an effective tool in mitigating
agency impacts on listed species.279 Moreover, Wisconsin’s additional
substantive criterion for state agency actions—that they not jeopardize the
“whole plant-animal community” of which the listed species is a part—
shows how states can serve as laboratories for legal innovations that may
prove more effective than the ESA, if monitored.280 Cooperative federalism
could also promote monitoring through Service oversight of grants and
delegation.
If Congress wants states to assume a greater role in preventing
extinctions, cooperative federalism offers a useful model.281 However,
merely transferring the Services’ funding to states seems unlikely to achieve
greater recovery success under most existing state laws. It might quell
dissatisfaction with the federal program by blunting prohibitions and
allowing more landowners to go about their business with less regulation.
But, it would also undermine the goal of the ESA to improve the condition of
species at the brink of extinction to a point where they no longer need
intensive care. Everybody endorses collaborative conservation, but
cooperative efforts depend on incentives for stakeholders to participate,
often at the expense of more profitable opportunities. Short of direct
payments to businesses and landowners as inducements, collaborative

that its approach to natural resource decision making is the best way to achieve continual
improvement and to adapt to climate change).
276 Robert L. Fischman & J.B. Ruhl, Judging Adaptive Management Practices of U.S.
Agencies, 30 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268, 271–72 (2016); Martin A. Nie & Courtney A. Schultz,
Decision-Making Triggers in Adaptive Management, 26 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1137, 1141–42
(2012).
277 Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the
Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 692 (2008).
278 OR. ADMIN. R. 635-100-0135 (2017) (guidelines for Coho salmon); id. 635-100-0136
(Washington ground squirrel).
279 Compare WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(d) (2017), with ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012).
280 WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(a)(2).
281 Nagle, supra note 17, at 388–89 (arguing that cooperative federalism was the original
understanding of how the ESA would be implemented to achieve recovery).
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conservation requires that uncooperative parties face some risk or penalty.
The ESA provides those negative inducements. Current state legislation
mostly provides much less.
Our results show that states are capable of enacting regulatory schemes
that provide levels of imperiled species protection similar to the ESA.
However, most do not. Perhaps cooperative federalism can encompass a
grand bargain: more delegated authority and grants to states in exchange for
stronger state programs. The pollution-control statutes are widely credited
for enacting just such a deal. The Clean Air Act282 (CAA) and the CWA both
enjoy active participation from state agencies, which often assume
permitting responsibility as well as front-line enforcement and planning. One
approach to spur greater responsibility for extinction protection would be to
delegate otherwise federal functions, such as section 10 permitting, to states
fulfilling minimum standards that advance the goals of the ESA. Both the
CAA and CWA condition delegated permitting authority on state legal
requirements that are at least as stringent as federal standards.283 In many
cases, EPA retains state permit veto power.284
FWS has experimented with delegating section 10 permitting in
Florida,285 a state whose permitting standards, promulgated as an
administrative rule, are at least as stringent as the corresponding federal
standards.286 FWS requires that the Florida state permits be subject to
enforcement by both the Service and the state, and that the state provide for
administrative challenges to final permits.287 In that respect, the delegation
parallels EPA authorization of state permits to substitute for federal permits
under the CWA.288 Though no Florida legislation authorizes the state Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Commission to ban incidental take,289 the Florida
constitution provides the commission power to “exercise the regulatory and
executive powers of the state” over fish and wildlife.290 The Commission
exercised its power by promulgating a rule that bans harm, employing the

282

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).

283

Id. § 7410; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)–(c) (2012).
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).
See generally FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 103.

284
285

286 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.003 (2017) (prohibiting “take” of federally listed
species); id. r. 68A-27.007(2)(b) (authorizing the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission to issue permits for incidental take after taking into account several factors,
including whether “the incidental take could reasonably be avoided, minimized or mitigated”).
The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission is developing species-specific
permitting guidelines for its state-listed species. Species Conservation Measures and Permitting
Guidelines, FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/SU4T-X859 (last
visited Jan. 27, 2018). Such an effort goes beyond what the Services have been able to
accomplish for federal endangered species.
287 FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 103, at 4, 7.
288 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
289 FLA. STAT. § 379.101(38) (2017) (defining take as “taking, attempting to take, pursuing,
hunting, molesting, capturing, or killing”). Nothing in the legislative definition of prohibited
takes suggests a ban on harm, harass, or indirect/incidental injury.
290 FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 9.
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same terms as the federal definition.291 The section 6 cooperative agreement
allows the state incidental take permit to substitute for a federal one in
providing a liability shield for the federal take prohibition.292 Tough
regulations in Florida are built on weak statutory powers and are thus
potentially more vulnerable to political shifts in administrative appointments
to the commission. Nonetheless, the Florida experiment does show how
existing ESA authority is flexible enough to employ some standard
cooperative federalism tools.
States cooperate with the federal government, in part, to better serve
their citizens and businesses with local permitting. That is what motivated
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission to enter into its cooperative
agreement with the Service.293 The CWA lists eight prerequisites for states
seeking to substitute their pollution discharge permitting for EPA’s program.
The list includes many requirements that depend on state statutes giving the
state implementing agency powers equivalent to those the CWA gives to
EPA, such as permit termination, administrative inspection and monitoring
powers, public participation procedures, and enforcement tools.294 However,
unlike the major pollution-control permit programs, the ESA does not
provide for states to assume permitting responsibilities. One way to induce
greater cooperative federalism would be to amend the ESA to allow states to
issue incidental take permits that would substitute for federal section 10
permits if state legislation contains standards at least as strict as the ones in
section 10. A handful of states already qualify based on their legislation. We
recommend that the Services extend the Florida experiment to other states
that have strong legislation. We agree with the Western Governors’
Association that the Services “[c]larify or emphasize” whatever existing
authority they may have to authorize states to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction for incidental take permitting.295 A particularly important
clarification would be a Service description of the minimum legal authority
that would qualify a state for taking on permitting jurisdiction.
State assumption of permitting authority does more than relocate
regulatory tools; it typically triggers federal grants to administer state
programs. In line with the pollution-control model, the Western Governors’
Association has called for new federal monies to defray additional
administrative costs to states undertaking recovery programs.296 More grants
to states that take on greater responsibilities is a reasonable policy
suggestion, but would need to be accompanied by a list of minimum
administrative requirements that assure the public a voice in planning and
permitting. The minimum standards for state programs should include the
same kinds of assurances found in the CAA and CWA. Penalties for failure to
meet minimum standards generally amount to loss of state control and

291
292
293
294
295
296

FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 68A-27.001(4) (defining “take” to include “harm”).
FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 103, at 6–7.
Id. at 1–2.
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012).
WGA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 91, at 4.
WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 6.
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federal grants. But the CAA goes further in allowing EPA to withhold
transportation funding from uncooperative states.297
Greater state government involvement in extinction prevention is
important not just for ideological or political reasons stemming from a
Jeffersonian view of the federal system. The single greatest cause of species
decline into imperiled status is habitat modification or destruction.298
Therefore, decisions about land use are paramount in achieving recovery.
State laws directly, and indirectly through enabling legislation giving local
jurisdictions power over land use, provide key legal tools for reducing
extinction risks.299 There are opportunities for Congress and federal agencies
to strike bargains giving states a greater say over imperiled species
regulation in exchange for more effective habitat protection and
improvement. Three of the four vanguard states, Illinois, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin, appear to have already met any realistic minimum criteria.
The Western Governors’ Association has called for more flexible
approaches to conservation through ESA section 4(d) rules.300 Yet, 4(d) rules
are effective vehicles of cooperative federalism only with willing and
capable state agencies. States are gun-shy about accepting certain offers of
federal delegation where the regulation of private property will be
unpopular. For instance, none of the Puget Sound planning jurisdictions
carried out the program development needed to shield local land-use
decisions from the prohibition against harm through the ESA 4(d) rule for
Chinook salmon.301 While states have largely assumed responsibility for the
CWA pollutant discharge elimination system permits, they have declined to
adopt permits under the politically controversial section 404 program to
regulate filling wetlands.302 State politicians do not wish to become targets

297 “Uncooperative federalism” is another way of describing state actions that impede
federal statutory objectives. Most states act cooperatively in some areas of federal law where it
suits their interests, and less so with other federal programs. In some circumstances, it can be
politically advantageous for elected officials to challenge federal programs, despite lost
opportunities or litigation costs. Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I. Williamson, The Story of
Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L.
REV. 123, 170–71 (2011). For a slightly different perspective on the meaning of the term, see
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1258–59 (2009) (providing additional examples of uncooperative federalism).
298 See Wilcove et al., supra note 74, at 608–09 (recognizing habitat degradation as a threat
to 85% of imperiled species); see also NOSS ET AL., supra note 74, at 2, 5; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 74, at 35–38, 40.
299 Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 133–36; Nagle, supra note 17, at 386–87.
300 WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 3; WGA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 91, at 4.
301 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text; see also Eric S. Laschever, The

Endangered Species Act and Its Role in Land Use Planning: Lessons Learned from the Pacific
Northwest, 1 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 103, 111–13 (2011) (documenting the failure of a multi-county
initiative to qualify for the land-use management limitation under the 4(d) rule, despite local
public support for salmon recovery).
302 See State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/3CDN-PUMN (last updated Dec. 21, 2017) (describing the
permitting that states may assume under state laws but noting that only Michigan and New
Jersey have assumed administration of the program); see also Adrienne M. Sakyi, Note,
Mitigation Banking: Is State Assumption of Permitting Authority More Effective?, 34 WM. &

7_TOJCI.FISCHMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

122

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/3/2018 10:00 AM

[Vol. 48:81

for opposition from constituents who oppose constraints on private
property development. That only two states have ever assumed
administration of the 404 program should dampen the enthusiasm of
cooperative federalists who expect states to fill the shoes of the Services in
imperiled species conservation, if given the chance.303 As with habitat
modification, the filling of wetlands on private property presents
circumstances where broadly shared benefits of regulation are shouldered
by a concentrated class of landowners.304 Many proposals for more
delegation to states are political strategies for winning elections, not
necessarily offers to assume unpopular regulatory roles.305
One paradox in the federalism debate over extinction prevention
concerns the monitoring and listing of species on the brink of extinction.
States often claim to have the best information on species because of their
on-the-ground force of wildlife managers.306 There is a theory that would
support the position that states can monitor species status at a lower cost
than the central government.307 Federal listings generally occur only after
species populations decline significantly below the threshold of
endangerment.308 Yet, states often express surprise when ESA listings come
along, and then ask for a grace period to develop conservation plans aimed
at reversing the species slide.309 States asking for additional time to
implement recovery programs after a federal ESA listing raise two key
questions of state capacity.310 First, why did the state SWAP actions fail to
prevent federal listing? Second, does state legislation support a credible
program that can recover the species as effectively as the ESA program? Our
results suggest that, rather than more time, states need better legal tools to
address habitat-altering activities that imperil species. In addition to more
money to arrest species declines through implementation of SWAPs, states
need to bolster their more fearsome rules to channel private behavior
toward species conservation. Further research to canvass state regulations

MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1027, 1036–39 (2010) (describing Michigan’s experience with the
permit program).
303 State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, supra note 302.
304 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH BURLESON, RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:12
(2017), Westlaw (explaining how this political dynamic in the CWA 404 program creates
litigation and anger).
305 Fischman & Williamson, supra note 297, at 173–74.
306 See, e.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Nat. Res., supra note 41 (statement of Rep.
Doc Hastings, Chairman, Natural Resources Committee).
307 See Terry L. Anderson & Lawrence Reed Watson, An Economic Assessment of
Environmental Federalism: The Optimal Locus of Endangered Species Authority, in THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 21, 30.
308 See Biber & Brosi, supra note 168, at 394–95; David S. Wilcove & Lawrence L. Master,
How Many Endangered Species Are There in the United States?, 3 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENVT.
414, 414 (2005) (stating that only a fraction of imperiled species are listed under the ESA); see
also David S. Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S.
Endangered Species List: 1985–1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87, 90 (1993) (finding the median
size of animal populations listed under the ESA was approximately 1000).
309 See WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 3.
310 Id. at 5.
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and their effectiveness in practice is needed in order to better understand
what states have been able to achieve.
VII. CONCLUSION
The goal of the ESA is to conserve species to the point at which they no
longer need the emergency-room programs provided by statute in order to
avoid extinction.311 In 2016, an influential resolution of the Western
Governors’ Association asserted that the ESA could be effective “only
through a full partnership between the states, federal government, local
governments and private landowners.”312 Most commentators and
stakeholders across the political spectrum agree.313 However, much of the
ESA-reform debate centers only on what the federal government should do
to enter into full partnership. Largely neglected in this rhetorical oasis amid
ESA contention is the role of state legislative reform to support more
effective recovery.
If state imperiled species laws performed better in arresting species
declines, the Services would not be so overwhelmed by the flood of species
eligible for listing and by implementing protective programs. If Congress and
federal agencies performed better, states would spend less time on
extinction prevention. States would also have greater resources and more
opportunities for proactive conservation. The path forward requires all
parties to step back from blaming each other and instead strengthen the
ability of both state and federal actors to advance recovery goals. States that
do not wish to promote imperiled species conservation through legislation
could opt out of a cooperative federalism program. States that support
conservation may borrow from sister state legislation containing useful
models of interagency cooperation, prohibitions, and permits.
The harsh reality of recovering hundreds of species on the brink of
extinction due to habitat alteration that occurred over a span of decades, if
not centuries, is that it is resource intensive. Ecosystems may take many
years to mature into useful habitat and still rely on continued, active
management to sustain habitat quality.314 Thus, recovery often requires
expensive on-the-ground or in-the-water activities over the long term. The
costs are often borne by a relatively small number of landowners. Property
owners who forgo economically profitable land uses are justified in their
complaints about footing the bill for reversing previous habitat harms often
located elsewhere. However, the unavoidable burden of reversing long-term
311

See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 6.
313 See Nagle, supra note 17, at 387 & n.13 (2017) (citing dueling testimony from Briefing on
Improving the Endangered Species Act: Perspectives from the Fish and Wildlife Service and
State Governors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Water, and Wildlife of the H.
Comm. on Env. & Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 6–7, 36 (2015)) (noting that both Dan Ashe, former
312

Director of FWS, and Matt Mead, Governor of Wyoming, both agree about the need for statefederal partnership despite expressing diametrically opposite views on whether the ESA can be
characterized as a success or failure).
314 Dale D. Goble et al., Conservation-Reliant Species, 62 BIOSCIENCE 869, 869–70 (2012).
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trends in habitat degradation is that it costs someone something to get the
job done. Some “win-win” situations may arise.315 But generally, there are
two means for prompting recovery efforts. One is to place the burden on
habitat owners or users (where the habitat is unowned, as in the marine
environment, or where the habitat is publicly owned but a user group has
traditionally benefitted from its allocation, as in federal grazing lands). The
other is public financing through taxes. The resistance of political leaders to
do either characterizes the current stalemate over the ESA.
If the ESA is to work as written or to be revised constructively,
something has to give. Either governments will pony up more funding or the
private sector will bear more costs. Feasible political compromise likely
involves some mixing of both. But, merely transferring program
responsibilities from austerely funded federal agencies to even more cashstrapped state agencies will fail to advance the recovery goal of the ESA.
Most existing state legislation to recover imperiled species is weaker than
the ESA. There is no good reason to believe that state governments with
smaller budgets and weaker laws will achieve greater conservation success
than the federal program. Statutory reforms must be matched with money to
carry out conservation actions.
We found wide variation in state imperiled species legislation. The legal
landscape, like the physical landscape, is diverse and no single approach to
cooperative federalism will optimize recovery efforts across the country.
Several states are already more than capable of taking on ESA permitting
and other federal programs. We suggest that the Services and Congress
begin with those states in order to develop a record of conservation
successes. Our hope is that those pilot projects, married to financial
incentives, will spur other states to improve their legal, regulatory, and
management capabilities. Rather than respond to the loudest complainers,
the federal government should first pick partners who have demonstrated
their commitment to species recovery.

315 Thomas O. McShane et al., Hard Choices: Making Trade-Offs Between Biodiversity
Conservation and Human Well-Being, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 966, 967–68 (2011).

